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Abstract: Understanding the factors affecting irrigation management performance is crucial for
sustainable resource use, especially with the decentralized management mode of irrigation systems
being implemented in rural China. This paper contributes to the research field by incorporating
different categories of social trust and perceived organization support (POS) into the analysis of
irrigation management performance, by linking multiple elements that are based on the Institutional
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. We employed principal component analysis (PCA)
and ordered probit regression to analyze a database covering 785 households in the upstream of
the Yellow River basin. The results suggested that social trust and POS positively affected the
irrigation management performance, and social trust strengthened the positive effect of POS on the
performance. Furthermore, the results indicated that personal trust and institutional trust, as well as
perceived emotional support and physical support, positively affected the performance. In addition,
we also found that household characteristics, household cognition, group characteristics, physical
conditions, and rules-in-use also had significant impact on the performance. This paper can be
used to inform the government that social trust and POS need to be considered in the common-pool
resources (CPRs) management.
Keywords: social trust; perceived organizational support; irrigation management performance;
Institutional Analysis and Development framework; Yellow River basin; ordered probit
1. Introduction
China is facing severe water scarcity, especially in the Yellow River basin. The annual precipitation
over one-third of the Yellow River basin is less than 400 mm, and the remainder’s annual precipitation
is 400–800 mm [1]. Agricultural production in northern China is highly dependent on irrigation
water [2], particularly upstream of the Yellow River basin because its rainfall is low and erratic, and
its evaporative demand is high. To meet the demand of agricultural production, the government
invests heavily (609.96 billion yuan in 2016; the yuan is a Chinese currency unit: $1 = 6.94 yuan as
of December 2016) in the construction and maintenance of irrigation systems [3,4]. However, the
irrigation facilities and management services have really not been met [5]. This is largely due to
the inefficiency of rural China’s institutional setting and the public goods nature of common-pool
resources (CPRs). Since the agricultural taxation reform and the dissolution of the collective farming
system in rural China in the 1990s, the duty of irrigation management shifted from rural collectives
to individual households [5,6]. Consequently, participatory management has been observed as a
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major type of management reform in rural northern China [7]. Nevertheless, the non-excludability
and rivalry attributes of CPR make irrigation management particularly challenging [8,9], because
individuals tend to employ some self-interested strategies, like free-riding, to maximize their personal
benefit in irrigation. As a result, the irrigation management performance becomes poor, manifested
by under-provision of irrigation water and degradation of irrigation facilities [10]. In this situation,
the solution to improving irrigation management performance may ultimately rely on boosting rural
households’ participation. Therefore, our study seeks to explore the influencing factors that could
strengthen households’ participation, which would be beneficial for meeting the demand of irrigation
systems and achieving the goal of efficient management.
Several factors affect irrigation management, such as the land quality, degree of land
fragmentation, dependence on irrigation, trust among users, spatial order, and group size of water
users [11–14]. As many scholars have noted, social trust has been recognized as an essential factor
that can improve public goods management [15,16], by helping to avoid inefficient non-cooperative
traps and reduce free-riding problems through increasing communication and facilitating social
exchange [15]. In fact, ordinary Chinese villagers generally trust their relatives and fellow villagers,
regardless of whether or not the villagers are their neighbors [17], because of acquaintanceship and
frequent interactions. Previous studies revealed that individuals with high trust in others usually
have more propensity to use unselfish strategies and conduct cooperative activities to avoid social
dilemmas [18]. As a result, abundant collective activities and high irrigation management performance
are expected.
Besides social trust, perceived organization support (POS) can theoretically positively affect
management performance in many ways [19]. POS refers to organization members’ perception on
the degree to which the organization cares about their well-being and values their contributions [20].
With decentralizing water use management to local water user groups, locally governed organizations
are assigned the responsibility of water management, fee collection and irrigation system maintenance.
Thus, there is an urgent need to understand what these organizations can do to make irrigation
management more efficient. In irrigation management, when water user groups care about households’
well-being and give them physical assistance, it would fulfill households’ socioemotional needs and
would be very useful in helping households to achieve irrigation rights. In this situation, households
tend to form the feeling of obligation to repay the positive treatment of these organizations [21]. Based
on this feeling, they would like to participate in irrigation management under the coordination of
the water user groups. In line with this view, we hypothesize that households with high POS would
devote more efforts to helping the organizations through decreased withdrawal behaviors.
Theoretically, in the context of rural China, social trust and POS can also affect irrigation
management performance. On one hand, social trust is generally formed based on households’
geographical, kinship and affinity relationships in rural China [22,23]. Such relationship-based social
trust creates possibilities to improve the flow and quality of information, as well as to smooth the
communication and coordination with cooperation [24]. On the other hand, irrigation water in rural
China is managed mainly by village communities and/or water user associations (WUAs). Such
organizations coordinate or facilitate cooperation among villagers to achieve efficient irrigation [12].
Accordingly, households may participate in irrigation management energetically in return for the
POS. In line with the above ideas, social trust and POS may motivate households to participate
in the collective and supervisory activities of irrigation management. In this case, the irrigation
management performance would be improved. However, the literature on CPRs has mostly focused
on resource characteristics, sustainable resource use, and principles for institutional design [25–27],
while neglecting the impact of social trust and POS in irrigation management. Since these roles
potentially played by social trust and POS, it leads to a growing interest in their impact on the
irrigation management performance in rural China.
The main contribution of our study is incorporation of different categories of social trust and POS
into the analysis of irrigation management performance. In addition, the analysis of the moderating
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effect of social trust on the process of POS affecting the irrigation management performance, is also
something innovative. Based on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, first,
this study explicitly examines the roles that social trust and POS play in irrigation management
performance. Second, it examines the potentially different impacts of personal trust and institutional
trust, as well as perceived emotional support and physical support, on irrigation management
performance. Third, it analyzes, in particular, the moderating effect of social trust on the process
of POS affecting the irrigation management performance. Finally, it examines whether the effect of
social trust and POS on irrigation management performance is robust. Following the introduction, the
theoretical analysis framework of the influencing mechanism of irrigation management performance
is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we outline our materials and methods, including the data source
and the estimation approach. Then the empirical results and discussion will be described in Section 4.
After this, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the findings.
2. Theoretical Analysis Framework
2.1. Effect of Social Trust and POS
The literature widely recognizes that households’ collective activities are deeply embedded in
social and cultural contexts [28]. In fact, since Ostrom [15] introduced trust into the analysis of CPR,
social trust has been increasingly emphasized. It has been commonly argued that households are
more likely to participate in collective activities if they believe that others will do the same [29].
Accordingly, social trust considerably reduces opportunism and cooperative costs in collective
activities [30,31]. Furthermore, it facilitates a strong cooperative relationship between members
in irrigation management [32], because it encourages households to share information, knowledge,
and resources [33]. In this case, they would devote fewer resources to monitoring others’ behavior.
This could enable partners to address problems and adapt to external changes more easily in irrigation
management. Basically, the object of social trust can be individuals or institutions [34]. Households’
trust towards individuals is defined as personal trust, while the trust towards institutions is defined as
institutional trust in our study. The former sustains local interactions and it reduces the transaction
costs of cooperation, especially at the local level [35]. The latter enables the implementation of
initiatives, policies, and innovations [36]. Although the literature shows that social trust has a positive
effect on collective activities, empirical evidence for the effect of social trust on irrigation management
performance is weak. Since irrigation management performance is the outcome of activities, as noted
early, a positive impact of social trust on it is likely to emerge.
Since Eisenberger et al. [20] came up with POS, a growing body of research has investigated the
effect of POS on job performance, generally finding that the effect is positive [19,37]. Nevertheless,
the research subjects of POS are more often companies or other for-profit organizations [38], while
empirical evidence that is related to water user groups is rare. Given that these groups, which
are village communities and WUAs, organize and support households to participate in irrigation
management in rural China, the irrigation management performance would be affected. Therefore,
it is quite worth studying the effect of POS on irrigation management performance in water user
groups. POS can contribute to increasing members’ positive attitudes and behaviors, and help the
organization to achieve its goals [39]. Basically, POS is developed through members’ interactions
with organizational agents. It can be divided into perceived emotional support [20] and perceived
physical support [40]. The former is that organizations value members’ contributions and care about
their wellbeing [20]. It may help to achieve performance by enhancing members’ engagement [41].
The latter reflects the assistance (e.g., information, technique, training) that households receive from the
water user group. It may boost households to engage in and contribute to irrigation management [21].
Therefore, in water user groups, a positive impact of POS on irrigation management performance is
likely to emerge.
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Unfortunately, social trust and POS have been researched separately in most of the existing
literature. When the members received favorable treatment from the organization, they would feel an
obligation to give something back [39]. In addition, social trust is considered to be the key indicator of
favorable social exchanges [42] because it is important in the interactions among the members of the
organization. Due to the predictability and reliability of social trust, when members’ trust towards
their organization is high, members normally believe that the organization would do the right things
and act for their benefit [43]. In this case, members with POS would have more incentive to help
the organization achieve its goal, when compared with those who have the same POS but have low
trust towards their organization. In line with this view, as social trust grows, members with POS
are more willing to reciprocate organizational care and ensure positive attitudes and behaviors [44].
Similarly, as households’ trust in a village committee and/or WUA grows, households with POS
would be more willing to participate in irrigation management to return something to the organization.
Consequently, high irrigation management performance is expected. Therefore, potentially, social trust
could stimulate the effect of POS on the performance.
2.2. The IAD Framework
Previous studies have shown that multiple elements (e.g., rules, land, water scarcity, access to
water) are positively related to irrigation management [45–47]. By integrating multiple influence
factors of outcome into the analysis, the IAD framework has improved the explanatory capacity of the
literature. Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues proposed the IAD framework, and it can be further dated
back to the 1980s [48–50]. This framework can be mainly used to analyze policy and management
issues regarding CPR [51]. Specifically, the IAD framework can identify relevant explanatory factors to
set components that in a foundational structure of logical relationships. In addition, this framework is
focusing on the contextualization of interactive relationships among local factors leading to institutional
outcomes [45]. Since these attributes of the IAD framework, it is especially suitable for analyzing
irrigation management performance.
The IAD framework begins with the external variables (see Figure 1). It represents the initial
condition that households face in irrigation management [52]. Many studies focus on three broad
categories of initial conditions: physical conditions, rules-in-use, and community attributes [53,54].
Physical conditions affect the action situation because the characteristics of the resources might greatly
affect their use [55]. Also, the rules-in-use, which comprises formal and informal prescriptions, refers
to enforced prescriptions about what activities are required, prohibited, or permitted [56]. It provides
the means to help actors resolve social dilemmas and collective activities [57]. Community attributes
(besides the aforementioned social trust and POS), the household characteristics and cognition, and
the group characteristics are considered to enrich the framework. First, whether the households
participate in irrigation management would be affected by their characteristics, such as agricultural
income and ratio of members’ engaging in agricultural labor [58]. Moreover, the householders
usually have the right to the final decision in their families in rural China, decisions that may be
influenced by their characteristics, including age and educational attainment. Second, the household
cognition is important in irrigation management because it affects the households’ perception and
reaction to the surroundings [59]. If households believed that they could benefit from irrigation
management or if the expectation of farm production is optimistic, they would have positive intentions
to participate in irrigation management. Finally, the group characteristics, including the group size
and homogeneity, are widely expected to affect the ability to mobilize resources and the prospects for
collective activities [8].
At the core of the IAD framework are action situations that are affected by the external
variables. Action situations are the social spaces in which households interact, exchange goods
and services, solve problems, dominate each other, or fight [56]. The external variables can affect
action situations to generate interactions and outcomes that are evaluated by participants in the action
Water 2018, 10, 1252 5 of 22
situation [53]. Here, we focus on multiple external variables and how they lead to regularized irrigation
management performance.
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3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Area Description
Our survey was conducted in the Inner Mongolia and Ningxia Autonomous Regions in northern
China. The research area is in the upstream of the Yellow River basin, which is characterized as an arid
to semi-arid continental climate consisting of irregular precipitation (the annual aver ge precipit tio
ranges from 50 to 450 mm i Inner Mongolia and from 150 mm to 650 mm in Ningxi ). Due to water
scarcity, agriculture in this area relies heavily on irrigation. Irrigation water is diverted from the Yellow
River along concrete-lined or earthen can ls to supply downstream fields through gravity. There are
approximately 9.45 million mu (mu is a Chinese measure of land area: 1 mu = 1/15 ha) and 3.15 million
mu of land irrigated by the Yellow River in I ner Mongolia and Ningxia, respectively. We chose these
two provinces because they best represent the conditions f irrigation ma ageme t in the upstream of
the Yellow River basin.
3.2. Data Collection
Data collection was conducted from September to November of 2016 by a research team that
was led by the authors. We employed participant rural appraisal, semi-structured interviews, and
household int rviews. In addition, we designed the survey b sed on a multi-stage hierarchical
random-sampling procedure. We randomly selected two counties from each province. After that,
according to the gross agricultural p oduction level, we randomly chose 4–6 villages from ach s lected
county. After arriving at the sampled villages, we obtained the necessary officia documents on
households and irrigation canals distributions from the leaders of village committees/WUAs. Then,
based on this informat on, we ra domly chose 20–30 househol s from those that are sharing the
same irrigati canals in each sampled village. All of the sample useh lds are farming famil es,
which include pure pe sant households and part-time peasant households. The analytical sample
consists of 785 rural hou eholder . The re son we chose the householders i that they usu lly hav
the final decision aut rity in their famili s. The survey used an anonymous questionnaire that was
desig ed to match the methodology used. We used part of the i formation obtained from a series of
in-depth interviews with 20 household rs to de ign the questio naire before the main survey. Note
that all of th interviewees gave their an wers to the questions i th questionnaire based on their
own perception and judgment. Gene ally, the field survey aimed to collect detailed information on
five aspe ts of the sample households: socio-demographic characteristics, condit ons o agricultural
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production, the situation of irrigation canals management, information of social trust, and information
of POS.
3.3. Methods and Econometric Model
Ordered probit regression and principal component analysis (PCA) were employed to analyze the
data from the survey. The dependent variables, used to measure irrigation management performance,
were generated by asking interviewees to make evaluations based on a five-point Likert scale. Since
the dependent variables are limited and ordinal, ordered probit regression is appropriate for this
research because it recognizes the indexed nature of various response variables. Estimated models can
be written, as follows:
y∗i = x
′
i β + εi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N (1)
where y∗i is latent variable; i is the number of each observation; x
′
i is the vector of the factors influencing
y∗i ; β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated; and, εi represents disturbances that are unobserved
with εi ∼ N [0, 1] [60]. Because y∗i cannot be measured directly, the observed outcome yi is related
to y∗i . Our estimation of the determinants of irrigation management performance is in line with the
following model:
Performancei = β0 + β1SocialTrusti + β2POSi + β3HouseholdCharacteristicsi
+β4HouseholdCognitioni + β5GroupCharacteristicsi
+β6PhysicalConditionsi + β7RulesinUsei + εi
(2)
The specialized interest of the analysis was to obtain consistent estimates of parameters β. To test
the moderating effect of social trust on the process of POS stimulating the irrigation management
performance, we introduced an interaction term between social trust and POS based on Equation (2)
as follows:
Performancei = β0 + β1SocialTrusti + β2POSi + β8SocialTrusti × POSi
+β3HouseholdCharacteristicsi + β4HouseholdCognitioni
+β5GroupCharacteristicsi + β6PhysicalConditionsi + β7RulesinUsei + εi
(3)
In addition, since social trust and POS incorporate multidimensional information, we employed
PCA, which can simplify information and incorporate categorical variables by transforming them into
numeric ones [61]. To ensure that the data sample was suitable for the analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
(KMO) test, Bartlett’s test of sphericity and Cronbach’s α coefficient were conducted. The results of
the KMO and Bartlett’s tests were 0.693 and 872.228 (0.000) for social trust and 0.930 and 7044.503
(0.000) for POS. Factors of social trust and POS explained about 69.72% and 62.61%, respectively, of the
variances. The Cronbach’s α of social trust and POS were 0.667 and 0.926, respectively. Therefore,
the data of social trust and POS is suitable for PCA. These analyses were performed while using two
statistical software products: IBM SPSS (IBM, New York, NY, USA) was used for PCA and STATA
(StataCorp LLC, College Station, TX, USA) was utilized for ordered probit regression analysis.
3.4. Variables
3.4.1. Dependent Variables
We measured the irrigation management performance subjectively by asking households to
evaluate the condition of irrigation canals and fairness of irrigation water allocation based on their
perception. Generally, performance can be measured either objectively or subjectively [11]. Since
households’ perception of performance is important to their decisions to participate in irrigation
management, it is more valuable to evaluate the irrigation management performance subjectively than
objectively. Furthermore, there are two main types of activities in irrigation management: collective
and supervisory activities [12]. Note that collective activities in this study are distinctly different
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from the term collective action in Ostrom [49]. The former means that the leader organizes the
actions of villagers in irrigation management [12], while the latter means that villagers cooperate in a
self-organizing way [49]. The irrigation canal systems are expected to become better through collective
activities that mainly refer to maintaining irrigation canals. Moreover, irrigation water allocation is
expected to become fair through supervisory activities that mainly refer to monitoring water allocation.
Basically, irrigation management performance is the outcome of both collective and supervisory
activities. Therefore, it can be measured in both the condition of irrigation canals and the fairness
of irrigation water allocation. The former is the key representation of the households’ contribution
in the maintenance. The latter is a critical manifestation of the rational allocation mechanism and a
households’ compliance with the irrigation rules. Based on these reasons, we developed the subjective
irrigation management performance indicators, including condition of irrigation canals and fairness of
irrigation water allocation.
3.4.2. Focused Independent Variables
The explanatory variables of primary interest are social trust and POS of households. Following
Koutsou et al. [16] and He et al. [62], we interviewed householders to get their level of trust in
individuals and institutions, on a five-point Likert scale (from 1 = distrust completely to 5 = trust
completely). Specifically, items include relatives, neighbors, and non-neighboring villagers, as well
as regulations and water user groups represented by the leaders of village committees/WUAs. Note
that social trust in this study is not the traditional meaning of the term, but the households’ rational
behavior expectation and affective commitment to others based on their own interests [62]. The items
were transformed considering the understanding ability and receptivity of households in the survey
(see Table 1). To shed more light on the effect of social trust, we disaggregated it into personal trust and
institutional trust by using PCA (see Table 1). The former is based on the relationship among people,
while the latter depends on the political and institutional environment [16].




I trust my relatives: If my relatives participate in irrigation
management, I will participate. 0.852 0.040
I trust my neighbors: If my neighbors participate in irrigation
management, I will participate. 0.862 0.095
I trust my non-neighboring villagers: If my non-neighboring
villagers participate in irrigation management, I will participate. 0.719 0.285
Institutional
Trust
I trust the Farmland Water Conservancy Regulations: I believe
villagers will follow the Farmland Water Conservancy Regulations. 0.110 0.834
I trust the leaders of my village committee/WUA: If leaders of my
village committee/WUA organize villagers participate in irrigation
management, I will participate.
0.137 0.826
As to POS, it was measured by using scales from Eisenberger et al. [20] and Ling et al. [40], which
were adapted in this study. Specifically, we measured the extent to which households perceive how
much the organizations care about their well-being and offer them assistance based on a five-point
Likert scale (from 1 = disagree strongly to 5 = agree strongly). Interviewees indicated the extent of their
agreement with each item. To acquire further information of the impact of POS, we broke the POS into
perceived emotional support and perceived physical support through PCA (see Table 2). The former
fulfills several socioemotional needs of households, while the latter provides the information, materials,
and rules to households in irrigation management [21].
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My village committee and/or WUA care(s) about my
opinions. 0.874 0.115
My village committee and/or WUA really care(s)
about my well-being. 0.770 0.355
My village committee and/or WUA strongly
consider(s) my goals and values. 0.846 0.231
Help is available from my village committee and/or
WUA when I have a problem. 0.553 0.180
My village committee and/or WUA would forgive
an honest mistake on my part. 0.866 0.238
If given the opportunity, my village committee
and/or WUA would take advantage of me. (R) 0.664 0.371
My village committee and/or WUA show(s) very
little concern for me. (R) 0.721 0.438
My village committee and/or WUA are/is willing to
help me if I need a special favor. 0.675 0.402
Perceived Physical
Support
My village committee and/or WUA would provide
water-related information to me. 0.054 0.743
My village committee and/or WUA would provide
irrigation training to me. 0.236 0.759
My village committee and/or WUA would inform
illegal use of irrigation water to me. 0.314 0.691
My village committee and/or WUA would inform
damages and leakages of irrigation canals to me. 0.256 0.579
My village committee and/or WUA would offer
cohesion for realizing collective activities. 0.350 0.747
My village committee and/or WUA would arrange a
water-intake-quota. 0.476 0.613
Note: (R) indicates the item is reverse scored.
3.4.3. Control Variables
The choices of control variables are based on the IAD framework. As noted early, we incorporated
five aspects of control variables in the analysis. The variables of household characteristics include
householders’ age, education, off-farm employment, leadership, agricultural income, and the ratio
of members’ engaging in agricultural labor. The variables of household cognition include the effect
of irrigation management on the condition of irrigation canals, the effect of irrigation management
on household income and the expectation of farm production. The variables of group characteristics
include the number of related households and the ratio of cereal crops (wheat, rice, and maize).
The variables of physical conditions include scarcity of irrigation water, irrigated land area, and
location of the plot. The variables of rules-in-use include formal rules, water intake order, and
punishment. The variables used are specifically defined in Table 3.
Water 2018, 10, 1252 9 of 22
Table 3. Definitions and summary statistics of variables.




1 = very poor; 2 = poor; 3 = normal; 4 = good;
5 = very good 3.670 0.966 1 5
Fairness of Irrigation
Water Allocation
1 = not fair at all; 2 = not fair; 3 = normal;
4 = fairly fair; 5 = very fair 3.378 1.065 1 5
Social Trust
Overall Trust Measured by the mean of 5 components ofsocial trust 3.983 0.552 1.600 5
Personal Trust Measured by the mean of 3 components ofpersonal trust 4.506 0.537 1.667 5
Institutional Trust Measured by the mean of 2 components ofinstitutional trust 3.199 0.896 1 5
POS
Overall Support Measured by the mean of 14 components of POS 3.443 0.660 1.143 4.929
Perceived Emotional
Support
Measured by the mean of 8 components of
perceived emotional support 3.238 0.710 1 5
Perceived Physical
Support
Measured by the mean of 6 components of
perceived physical support 3.717 0.731 1.167 5
Household Characteristics
Age Age of the householder in years 54.971 9.512 26 80
Education
Education level of householder: 1 = primary
school or below; 2 = middle school; 3 = high
school; 4 = college/university; 5 = graduate
school or above
1.628 0.685 1 5
Off−Farm Employment Whether the householder has off-farmemployment: 1 = yes; 0 = no 0.464 0.499 0 1
Leadership
One or more family members worked/are
working as village committee/WUA leaders:
1 = yes; 0 = no
0.206 0.405 0 1
Agricultural Income Logarithm of household agricultural income in2015 in yuan 10.482 1.023 6.579 13.271
Ratio of Agricultural
Labor
Ratio of household members engaging in
agricultural labor 0.645 0.258 0 1
Household Cognition
Effect on Condition of
Irrigation Canals
Whether condition of irrigation canals could be
improved if a household participated in
irrigation management: 1 = yes; 0 = no
0.831 0.375 0 1
Effect on Household
Income
The effect of irrigation management on the
household income: 1 = decreased strongly;
2 = decreased slightly; 3 = normal; 4 = improved
slightly; 5 = improved strongly
4.288 0.801 1 5
Expectation of Farm
Production
1 = not optimistic at all; 2 = not optimistic;
3 = normal; 4 = fairly optimistic; 5 = very
optimistic




Number of households sharing the same
lateral canal 24.029 13.603 5 60
Ratio of Cereal Crops Ratio of cereal crops area to total farming area 0.566 0.420 0 1
Physical Conditions
Water Scarcity 1 = not scarce at all; 2 = not scarce; 3 = normal;4 = fairly scarce; 5 = very scarce 3.558 1.004 1 5
Irrigated Land Area Total area of irrigated land cultivated by ahousehold in mu 38.151 35.937 1 250
Location of Plot
The distance from the plot to the lateral canal:
1 = 0–100 m; 2 = 101–200 m; 3 = 201–300 m;
4 = 301–400 m; 5 = 401 m and above
1.236 0.762 1 5
Water 2018, 10, 1252 10 of 22
Table 3. Cont.
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rules-in-Use
Formal Rules Whether formal irrigation management rulesexist: 1 = yes; 0 = no 0.387 0.487 0 1
Water Intake Order Whether water intake order is specified: 1 = yes;0 = no 0.819 0.385 0 1
Punishment Whether punishment is specified in irrigationmanagement: 1 = yes; 0 = no 0.452 0.498 0 1
Note: $1 = 6.48 yuan based on exchange rate in December 2015; 1 mu = 1/15 ha.
3.5. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides the definition of the variables used in the ordered probit model with some basic
statistics, such as mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. The condition of irrigation
canals was between “normal” and “good”, indicating that they still need to be improved, probably
because the earthen canals dug into the ground lead to significant water losses in the survey area.
Moreover, the fairness of irrigation water allocation was between “normal” and “fairly fair,” indicating
that the illegal use of irrigation water was not frequent. As for social trust, households had quite a
high level of social trust, as well as personal and institutional trust. However, the households had a
higher level of personal trust than institutional trust, most likely because interviewees built relatively
intimate relationship with relatives, neighbors, and non-neighboring villagers based on kinship and
geography. The POS of households was high, as was perceived emotional and physical support. This
indicates that households recognize and acknowledge the organizational support.
In terms of the control variables, the mean age of the sample householder was 55, and the average
educational attainment was between “primary school or below” and “middle school”. Moreover, more
than half of the householders were full-time farmers. In addition, most of the observed farmers were
farm laborers. Only 20.6% of the households had family members who had worked or were working
as village committee/WUA leaders. The average agricultural income in 2015 for the sample household
was about 57,118 yuan ($1 = 6.48 yuan as of December 2015). In addition, most of the households
thought that the condition of irrigation canals and their household income could be improved if they
participated in irrigation management. In contrast, the households were generally not optimistic
about their prospects for farm production. About 24 households shared the same lateral canal, and
the mean distance from the plot to the lateral canal was between 0 and 200 m. Cereal crops were
cultivated on more than half of the farm land. Water was scarce, indicating that irrigation is important
for agricultural production. The mean area of irrigated land was about 38.151 mu, indicating that
most of the sample households have smallholdings. Only 38.7% of the households considered that
the formal rules of irrigation management existed. In contrast, most of households thought the water
intake order was specified and about half of them thought that the punishment was specified.
4. Results and Discussion
The test for multicollinearity among the explanatory variables was measured by variance inflation
factors (VIF) to ensure that the ordered probit regression was correctly specified. The results of the test
were all below 3 (see Appendix A).
4.1. Estimation Results: Social Trust
Overall trust had a significant and positive effect on the condition of irrigation canals and
the fairness of irrigation water allocation at the 1% level (see Table 4 for Model 2). There are two
possible reasons. First, households with high social trust would feel more social pressure because
they value the fellowship of their friends and associates, and their social status, personal prestige, and
self-esteem [63]. Thus, they tended to avoid free-riding in collective activities, which was beneficial for
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the condition of irrigation canals, under the constraint of negative selective incentives [64]. Second,
high social trust could help spread information faster and more efficiently through the establishment
of information-sharing systems between households, which could provide mutual supervision of
households’ behavior [49]. Consequently, this could help to reduce the illegal use of irrigation water
and ensure its fair allocation. In short, these functions of social trust could help to improve the
irrigation management performance.
To investigate the effects of the components of social trust on irrigation management performance,
we replaced the overall trust with personal trust and institutional trust in Model 3 in Table 4. Personal
and institutional trust also had a significantly positive effect on the condition of irrigation canals and
the fairness of irrigation water allocation at the 1% level, for the following possible reasons. First,
personal relationship that is established through kinship and geography is the important link for
households to cooperate. The intimate interaction between households and their relatives, neighbors,
and non-neighboring villagers might enhance mutual recognition and reduce the transaction costs
of reaching concerted action. In this case, collective activities would be achieved to improve the
condition of irrigation canals. In addition, this intimate interaction could promote the sufficiency and
symmetry of information. This could ensure effective household supervision of the use of irrigation
water to achieve its fair allocation. Second, institutional trust refers to households’ trust towards the
leaders of the village committee/WUA and policy. On the one hand, households would have a positive
psychological expectation of the water user group if they trusted the leaders [65,66]. This would help to
form an informal risk reduction system and enhance household confidence in irrigation management.
Consequently, households would tend to participate in collective activities to ensure that irrigation
canals work well. On the other hand, households would follow the regulations if they believed that
others would do it. This would help to reduce the illegal use of irrigation water and ensure the fairness
in irrigation water allocation.
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Table 4. The effects of social trust and POS on irrigation management performance.
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(1) Condition (2) Fairness (3) Condition (4) Fairness (5) Condition (6) Fairness (7) Condition (8) Fairness
Social Trust







Personal Trust 0.193 ***(0.042)
0.118 ***
(0.041)











Perceived Emotional Support 0.150 ***(0.045)
0.121 ***
(0.044)
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Table 4. Cont.
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(1) Condition (2) Fairness (3) Condition (4) Fairness (5) Condition (6) Fairness (7) Condition (8) Fairness
Group Characteristics


























































































































Number of Observations 785 785 785 785 785 785 785 785
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1618 0.1382 0.1924 0.1609 0.1937 0.1749 0.1997 0.1643
Log Likelihood −848.5163 −929.8262 −817.4784 −905.3402 −816.2201 −890.1525 −810.0887 −901.5812
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
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4.2. Estimation Results: POS
Overall support had a significantly positive effect on the irrigation management performance
at the 1% level (see Model 2 in Table 4). Since an irrigation system has the nature of a public good,
support from a water user group is essential to its management. On the one hand, overall support could
reduce the investment pressure of individual households in irrigation management through organized
collective activities. On the other hand, it could make households perceive that the organization
attaches importance to the management of the irrigation system [21]. Both of these would enhance the
households’ expectations for irrigation management and promote the implementation of collective
activities. Thus, the condition of the irrigation canals would improve. Furthermore, water user groups
could reduce the illegal use of irrigation water by restricting or punishing measures. Thus, households
could fully realize their irrigation rights and ultimately achieve the fair allocation of irrigation water.
To shed more light on the influence of POS, we replaced the overall support with perceived
emotional support and physical support in Model 3 in Table 4. The results revealed that both had
a significantly positive effect on the performance at the 1% level, for the following possible reasons.
First, perceived emotional support from a water user group would help households to fulfill their
socioemotional needs in irrigation management. In this case, households would be willing to reward
organizational identification based on reciprocity and affective commitment [67]. In other words,
they would like to actively participate in irrigation management to make irrigation canals better.
On the other hand, strong emotional support could stimulate households’ role behavior, organizational
citizenship behavior and altruistic behavior [68]. All of these would effectively decrease households’
illegal use of irrigation water to ensure its fair allocation. Secondly, households would increase their
recognition of the water user group if they perceived that it provided them with material support
or technical assistance in irrigation. Households with high recognition tended to contribute more to
irrigation management to improve the condition of irrigation canals. Moreover, the good physical
support provided by the water user group to the households could guarantee their supervision of
irrigation. This would be useful for a fair allocation of irrigation water.
4.3. Estimation Results: Moderating Effect
The estimation results suggested that social trust significantly and positively strengthened the
positive effect of POS on the irrigation management performance at the 1% level (see Model 4 in
Table 4). The possible reasons are as follows. If the households trusted the water user group, they
would believe that it would do the right things and act for their benefit. In this case, households with
high POS were more likely to engage in irrigation management as their social trust increased. In other
words, if households trusted the members and institutions, households with POS would actively
participate in collective activities under the coordination of the leaders in order to achieve the effective
maintenance of irrigation canals. In addition, they would actively participate in supervisory activities
to guarantee the fairness of irrigation water use.
4.4. Estimation Results: Control Variables
The final results have to do with the impacts of control variables, as shown in Table 4. The results
indicated that two variables in household characteristics, namely education and leadership, had
a significantly positive effect on the condition of irrigation canals. However, only leadership had
a significantly positive effect on the fairness of irrigation water allocation. This might be because
households with a high educational level and rich leadership had a deeper understanding of the
importance of irrigation canals. This would be helpful for households to participate in collective
activities. As a result, the condition of irrigation canal would become better. Moreover, households with
leadership would have strong negotiation power, which could lead them to achieve the fair allocation
of irrigation water. Age cannot statistical significantly affect irrigation management performance.
The reason might be that, regardless of the age of the householders, they all can be physically
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and mentally competent to participate in irrigation management. As for agricultural income, its
non-significant coefficients might due to the fact that households with different agricultural income are
financially qualified for participating in irrigation management. Thus, their contribution in irrigation
management and, subsequently, irrigation management performance will not vary along with the
variation of householders’ age and agricultural income.
For household cognition variables, the fact that irrigation management could improve the
condition of irrigation canals and household income had a significantly positive effect on the irrigation
management performance. Because irrigation systems are necessary to deliver irrigation water that is
crucial to agricultural production, if households considered irrigation management to be important
for the condition of irrigation canals and their income, they would try to participate in the irrigation
management driven by self-value realization and benefits.
Regarding the group characteristics variables, the number of related households had a significantly
negative effect on the irrigation management performance. In addition, the ratio of cereal crops had a
significantly positive effect on the condition of irrigation canals. This might be because the problem
of free-riding would become severe with the increase in the households while using the same lateral
canal. Free-riding behavior could exacerbate households’ feeling that irrigation water use is unfair
and weaken their enthusiasm for participating in irrigation management. This would lead to the
deterioration of irrigation canals. Moreover, the types of cereal crops cultivated by households in the
same village were generally the same. The households growing the same cereal crops would have a
consistent demand for irrigation water, indicating a high degree of homogeneity [58]. This could boost
households’ participation in collective activities to maintain the irrigation canals.
For the physical conditions variables, water scarcity and irrigated land area had a significant and
positive effect on the condition of irrigation canals. In contrast, location of plot had a significantly
negative effect on irrigation management performance. When the irrigated land size and the water
scarcity increased, demand for reliable irrigation water supply increased. Thus, much effort was
required to maintain irrigation canals well enough to reduce the loss of irrigation water. Nevertheless,
tail-enders, whose plots were far away from the lateral canal, experienced more water stress than their
counterparts at the head of the carnal [69]. What is worse was that head-enders could afford to ignore
the demands and well-being of tail-enders, when head-enders perceived that they did not need the
help from tail-enders [70]. Consequently, tail-enders would believe water allocation was unfair and
have no incentive to maintain the irrigation canals.
With regard to rules-in-use variables, the formal rules and punishment had a significantly positive
effect on the condition of irrigation canals. Similarly, water intake order and punishment had a
significantly positive effect on the fairness of irrigation water allocation. The reason might be that the
establishment of the formal rules could create incentives to make cooperation a rational choice [71],
which might, as a result, improve the condition of the irrigation canals. Furthermore, the specified
water intake order would help realize the fairness of water allocation because it could avoid the
possibility of depriving water from those who start irrigating late or are tail-enders. In addition,
households might try to participate in the maintenance of irrigation canals and get access to irrigation
water legally in order to avoid punishment.
4.5. Robustness Test Results
To assess the robustness of the estimation results, we re-estimated Model 2 in Table 4 while
using two alternative methods (see Models 5–6 in Appendix A). Model 5 estimated the samples
after removing elderly people over 60 years old while using ordered probit regression. Because the
elderly people are physically frail, the disadvantages are more obvious when they engage in irrigation
management. Model 6 replaced the overall trust and overall support variables with other measurement
variables. Overall trust was measured by the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted?” [72]. We used a five-point Likert scale from “1 = most people cannot be trusted”
to “5 = most people can be trusted.” Overall support was also measured by the responses to the
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statement “The village committee and/or WUA actively seek financial subsidies for the construction
and maintenance of irrigation canals” [21]. We used a 5-point Likert scale from “1 = strongly disagree”
to “5 = strongly agree.” As indicated in Model 5 and Model 6, the results that were obtained by these
two alternative methods were consistent with the results in Model 2.
5. Summary and Conclusions
With the decentralized management mode of irrigation being implemented in rural China,
understanding the factors affecting irrigation management performance in a new mode is crucial for
the use of sustainable resources. Given that households’ behavior is motivated by social trust and POS,
we focused on their impact on irrigation management performance in the upstream of the Yellow River
basin in China. Furthermore, we investigated the moderating effect of social trust on POS impacting
the performance. Specifically, we examined the impact of personal trust and institutional trust, which
were the major components of social trust concluded through PCA, on the performance. Similarly,
we examined the effect of perceived emotional support and physical support, major components of
POS concluded through PCA. Moreover, we followed the IAD framework to examine the impact of
other multiple factors on irrigation management performance. Then, we employed ordered probit
regression to analyze the database covering 785 sample households in the survey area. The empirical
results showed that irrigation management performance, including the condition of irrigation canals
and the fairness of irrigation water allocation, could be promoted by social trust and POS as well as
their major components. Moreover, social trust could stimulate the effect of POS on the performance.
In addition, household characteristics, household cognition, group characteristics, physical conditions,
and rules-in-use had significant effect on the performance.
In this context, several interesting points arise. First, although a plethora of studies document that
social trust is important for households’ cooperation in irrigation management [16,18], our findings
provide complementary insights into this issue. Specifically, social trust can positively affect irrigation
management performance. As opposed to previous studies, we analyze the effect of different categories
of social trust, including personal and institutional trust, on the performance. Second, we contribute to
the research field by bringing POS into the analysis of irrigation management performance. This is
an extension of previous research on POS, because the subjects have been mostly companies or other
for-profit organizations [38], while empirical evidence regarding water user groups is rare. However,
in rural China, the leaders of village committees and/or WUAs organize the collective and supervisory
activities of households in irrigation management [12]. Note that the WUAs usually are not established
based on hydrological boundaries, but village administrative boundaries [73]. Therefore, the WUA is
usually incorporated into a village committee rather than a dependent organization and the leaders
of WUAs usually consist of village leaders in rural China. Even so, this does not prevent households
from being actively involved in irrigation management to achieve irrigation efficiently when they
perceive support from the village committee/WUA. Moreover, our analysis of the impact of different
categories of POS on irrigation management performance is also a major innovation. Third, we show
the combined influence of social trust and POS on irrigation management performance. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first study on this subject. Furthermore, in practice, our findings provide a
useful guide for managers. If a water user group sets out to make CPR management more efficient
and sustainable in the long run, then the managers need to take social trust and POS into account.
Despite its contributions, there are several limitations that need to be acknowledged about this
research. First, the sample provinces are located in the upstream of the Yellow River basin, therefore
representing the arid and semi-arid areas of China. Nevertheless, further research is needed to ascertain
whether our findings are applicable to other areas as well. Secondly, the cross-sectional design is also a
limitation, because the social trust and POS are formed and developed during a gradual process. Thus,
future research for enriching our findings could potentially proceed with longitudinal design.
As far as the China context is concerned, future extensions to this research should encompass
additional issues. An important issue of irrigation management that needs to be considered is its weak
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irrigation management mechanism. This study shows that the formal rules, water intake order, and
punitive institution positively affect irrigation management performance. However, the irrigation
management of many villages do not have sound formal rules or a punitive institution. Due to the
lack of an efficient irrigation management mechanism at the village level, the irrigation management
performance mainly depends on the ability of the water user group leaders. Consequently, it varies
according to village, leadership, and time. Even worse, since many villages lack a punitive institution
for wrongdoing (e.g., non-participation in maintenance of irrigation canals and non-compliance with
water intake order), the households that do not follow the rules can still enjoy the same irrigation
conditions and rights as those that do. This phenomenon, obviously, can increase the latter’s perception
of unfairness, which is not conducive to irrigation management. Therefore, it is clearly crucial to
investigate how to build a well-developed irrigation management mechanism at the village level,
according to the local conditions, in order to achieve effective and sustainable irrigation management.
This could be a fruitful area for future research.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Multicollinearity diagnosis.
Collinearity Statistics
1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF
Age
Social Trust
Overall Trust 0.847 1.180
Personal Trust 0.919 1.088
Institutional Trust 0.776 1.288
POS
Overall Support 0.675 1.481
Perceived Emotional Support 0.796 1.257
Perceived Physical Support 0.652 1.533
Household Characteristics
Education 0.960 1.042 0.960 1.042
Off-Farm Employment 0.875 1.142 0.871 1.148
Leadership 0.893 1.119 0.891 1.123
Agricultural Income 0.427 2.342 0.426 2.346
Ratio of Agricultural Labor 0.944 1.060 0.939 1.065
Household Cognition
Effect on Condition of Irrigation Canals 0.753 1.328 0.743 1.346
Effect on Household Income 0.767 1.303 0.756 1.322
Expectation of Farm Production 0.913 1.095 0.902 1.109
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Table A1. Cont.
Collinearity Statistics
1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF
Age
Group Characteristics
Number of Related Households 0.920 1.087 0.889 1.125
Ratio of Cereal Crops 0.689 1.450 0.688 1.453
Physical Conditions
Water Scarcity 0.865 1.156 0.826 1.211
Irrigated Land Area 0.476 2.101 0.474 2.109
Location of Plot 0.850 1.176 0.849 1.177
Rules-in-Use
Formal Rules 0.800 1.250 0.796 1.257
Water Intake Order 0.709 1.411 0.707 1.415
Punishment 0.711 1.407 0.683 1.464
Table A2. Robustness test.
Variables
Model 5 Model 6
(9) Condition (10) Fairness (11) Condition (12) Fairness
Social Trust
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Table A2. Cont.
Variables
Model 5 Model 6
(9) Condition (10) Fairness (11) Condition (12) Fairness
Rules-in-Use





















Number of Observations 552 552 785 785
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2238 0.1832 0.1736 0.1583
Log Likelihood −547.8748 −620.6902 −836.4805 −908.0669
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
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